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
Purpose


To update the MNF-I Commander on recent actions in MND-B since the advent of Operation Pegasus Security Forever, and present plans for ongoing operations.



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
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
Tasks by Phase


- Phase 1: Setting the Conditions
 - Conduct focused raids, patrols and snap checkpoints in order to disrupt militia and AIF operations throughout Baghdad City
 - Initiate establishment of JSS concept within each of the nine Security Framework Districts
- Phase 2: Clear, Control, Retain
 - Simultaneously conduct clear, control, or retain operations throughout Baghdad City
 - Complete the establishment of JSS concept within each of the nine Security Framework Districts
 - Continue to progress the Hayys from Clear to Control to Retain
 - Continue to create “gated communities” in Retain Hayys
- Phase 3: Retain and Renewal
 - Enhance Transition Teams
 - ISF assume responsibility for security in all Districts
 - CF provides operational overwatch
- Phase 4: Transition and Exploit
 - CF maintains operational overwatch of ISF within Baghdad City and moves outside of Baghdad City and attacks AIF support zones to complete the reduction of AIF within MND-B AOR


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
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










































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     	EAST		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE	
	ADHAMIYAH		1		325	
	SADR CITY		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE	
	RUSAF		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE	
	NEW BAGHDAD		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE	
	KARADAH		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE	
	KADAMIYAH		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE	
	AL MANSOUR		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE	
	RASHID (WEST)		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE	
	RASHID (EAST)		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE	
KARKH		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE		
WEST						
ADHAMIYAH		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE		
SADR CITY		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE		
RUSAF		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE		
NEW BAGHDAD		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE		
KARADAH		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE		
KADAMIYAH		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE		
AL MANSOUR		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE		
RASHID (WEST)		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE		
RASHID (EAST)		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE		
KARKH		PARTNER		IN-BATTLESPACE		











We are beginning Phase 1 now with focusing 3/2 SBCT on specific areas and directing land owning BCTs to begin control tasks. If we have sufficient combat power available, we can begin clearing on 15 January.


As we come to the end of January, two decisions present themselves. First, if offensive clearing is not done we may have to delay transfer of 6 and 9 IA to IGFC. The other decision is whether we must prosecute targets in Sadr City to eliminate AIF resistance.


















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(b)(5)


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HURRIYA JSS_KADHIMIYA SFD_1/1 6 IA_TF 2-12 CAV MB 3655 8990															
ISF UNITS NP: IA: 1/1/6 IA IP: HURRIYA IP CF UNIT: 2-12 CAV GRID: MB 3655 8990 CELL PHONE #:		HURRIYA FP REQUIREMENTS													
		T-WALL	ALASKA	TEXAS-T	JERSEY	SCUD	S-BAGS	DNCRIN	PICKETS	CAMO NET	21BF	POSRPG	SCRY	CABLE	CLAMPS
		74		170	50	4	6000	600m±118	380	12 SETS	4	240#	480m	36	
		LIFE SUPPORT 3 ROOM AVERAGE													
		ELECTRICAL	POWER	BRAKER	CIRCUIT	GEN	FUEL CEL	HEAT/IR	FIRE PREVENTION	FIELD SAN					
		LIGHTS	SWITCH	PLUGS	WIRING	BOXES	BRAKERS	TOROW*	350gal*	CLIMATE	SMOKE	EXTING	LATRINE	CHRG	
		24	12	40	20074	2xBUILD	20x2 box	1	1	10	10	12	1	1	
STATUS		<div style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em;">1.4c</div> <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em;">1.4c</div>													
IA Occupied															
NP Occupied															
IP Occupied															
CF Occupied															
Force Protection															
Commo w/ HHQ															
Commo w/ Sub-Units															
Map Board															
TOC Furniture															
Office Supplies															
Life Support															
IOC FOC															

AMERIYA JSS_MANSOUR SFD_5/6 IA BDE_TF 1-5_MB332854														
ISF UNITS NP: 2/5/2 NP IA: 2/1/6 IA IP: Khadra CF UNIT: HHC/1-5 CAV GRID: MB 332854 CELL PHONE #: (b)(6)		AMERIYA FP REQUIREMENTS												
		T-WALL	ALASKA	TEXAS-T	JERSEY	SCUD	3-BAGS	ONCERTIN	PICKETS	DAMO NE	218F-POS	PG SCR	CABLE	CLAMPS
		64		112	0	4	6000	600mm-116	300	12 SETS	4	240H	486m	36
		LIFE SUPPORT # ROOM AVERAGE												
		ELECTRICAL	POWER	BRAKER	CIRCUIT	OEN	FUEL CEL	HEAT/HAIR	FIRE PREVENTION	FIELD SAN				
		LIGHTS	SWITCH	PLUG	WIRING	BOXES	BRAKERS	100KV+	200psi	CLIMATE	SMOKE-EXTING	LATRINE	ISRG	
STATUS IA Occupied NP Occupied IP Occupied CF Occupied Force Protection Commo w/ HHQ Commo w/ Sub-Units Map Board TOC Furniture Office Supplies Life Support		<div style="text-align: center;">1.4c</div>												
05 JAN IOC FOC		Notes on Amber Status 1-2: JOC manned, but not command emphasis in those formations. 3-4: NP & IP require communications other than cell phones 5-6: Marginal - tables & chairs, no desks or other furniture, minimal office supplies; all on contract pending approval 7: Green for ISF; Amber if CF expected to occupy 24/7 (anything more than JSS-manning)										<div style="text-align: center;">1.4c</div>		

ADL JSS_MANSOUR SFD_5-6 IA BDE_TF 1-5_MB363887																
ISF UNITS NP: 5/2 NP IA: 5/6 IA & 2/1/8 IA IP: Khadra IP CF UNIT: E/4 CAV (1-5 CAV) GRID: MB 363887 CELL PHONE #:			ADL FP REQUIREMENTS													
			T-WALL	ALASKA	TEXAS-T	JERSEY	SGUD	5-BAGS	DN CERTIN	PICKETS	CAMO NET	210F-PO	RPG	SCRN	CABLE	CLAMPS
			54		505	30	4	6000	600mm*118	380	12 SETS	4	240*	486m	36	
			LIFE SUPPORT 8 ROOM AVERAGE													
			ELECTRICAL	POWER	BRAKER	CIRCUIT	GEN	FUEL CEL	HEAT/AIR	FIRE PREVENTION	FIELD SAN					
			LIGHTS	SWITCH	PLUG	WIRING	BORES	BRAKERS	100K W+	200gal +	CLIMATE	STACK	EXTING	LATRINE	GRBG	
			24	12	40	2000+	2x BUILD	20x2 box	1	1	10	10	12	3	FLAT ROCK	
STATUS			<div style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em;">1.4c</div> <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em;">1.4c</div>													
IA Occupied																
NP Occupied																
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





MNC-I Concept for Operational Reserve

- Operational Reserve BDE is envisioned as a land-owning force employed in crisis conditions under authority of the PM.
- Operational Reserve BDE activated by National Joint Operations Center once it is operational (15 Jan 07):
 - NJOC notifies MOD / MOI --- who then notifies IGFC and NP HQs
 - NP HQs notifies NP Mech BN; IGFC notifies 9IA
 - 9IA accounts for, deploys, and provides C2 for Operational Reserve BDE
 - MND-B will alert TACON Operational Reserve units once PM decides to employ them
- Timeline
 - 2 Jan 07 – Commex
 - 8-10 Jan 07 – Key Leader Rehearsal
 - 13-15 Jan 07 – Emergency Muster Exercise
 - 16 Jan 07 – Emergency Muster Exercise complete, units released to MND-B


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








- ☐ reflections indicate associates of detainee's unable to act due to increased CF presence
- ☐ indicates other C2 have fled both Sadr City and Shula fearing CF detainment / unfriendly environment - from Sadr City and Sheikh Hamid from Shula
- ☐ indicates OMS released statement following detention claiming that he was part of JAM but had left the organization 4 months ago / No indications of reactions to yet, however indications are (b)(6) may be bigger fish than we thought MTF as we collect more
- ☐ IVO Karbala chastised Sadr city Jam for not firing on CF when the detained ordered future attacks on CF that enter the city.
- Unconfirmed 1.4c reporting indicates that orders from Najaf are to stop assassinating Sunni and focus attacks on CF - conflicting reporting between sources on whether to attack outside Sadr City or within - majority of indicates that JAM is still preparing for a CF offensive on Sadr City




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
1.4c indicates other C2 have fled both Sadr Cit and Shula fearin CF detainment / unfriendly environment **(b)(6)** from Sadr City and Sheikh Hamid from Shula

1.4c indicates OMS released statement following **(b)(6)** detention claiming that he was part of JAM but had left the organization 4 months ago / No indications of reactions to **(b)(6)** yet, however indications are **(b)(6)** may be bigger fish than we thought MTF as we collect more 1.4d

(b)(6) IVO Karbala chastised Sadr city Jam for not firing on CF when the detained **b 6** ordered future attacks on CF that enter the city.

Unconfirmed 1.4c reporting indicates that orders from Najaf are to stop assassinating Sunni and focus attacks on CF - conflicting reporting between sources on whether to attack outside Sadr City or within - majority of 1.4c indicates that JAM is still preparing for a CF offensive on Sadr City





After the spike in VBIED attacks that occurred following the 23 November attacks directed at Shia in Sadr City, overall VBIED activity dropped off by 26% within the Beladiyahs. Despite this drop, the increased use of suicide VBIED during the 7 – 20 Dec period produced higher WIA than the previous period. This effective use of suicide bombers maintained tensions between Shia and Sunni groups keeping the overall attacks against civilians between the periods consistent. While the last two weeks has seen a slight increase in overall VBIED activity, the number of detonated VBIED decreased by 1 and there were no suicide VBIEDs. The last reported suicide VBIED directed at civilians was on 20 December. The use of static VBIEDs can be attributed to the reduced numbers of KIA and WIA civilians during the period. We expect the number of suicide VBIEDs to pick back up to around 5 – 8 per month, increasing the number of KIA and WIA civilians as the Abu Nur Network continues to try to destabilize Baghdad.

KIA / WIA of VBIED Attacks by Period

23 NOV – 6 DEC IA KIA – 2, IA WIA – 1, IP KIA – 1, IP WIA – 1, LN KIA – 237, LN KIA – 310
 7 – 20 DEC IA KIA – 0, IA WIA – 19, IP KIA – 3, IP WIA – 19, LN KIA – 87, LN WIA – 345
 21 DEC – 3 JAN IA KIA – 0, IA WIA – 0, IP KIA – 0, IP WIA – 2, LN KIA – 105, LN WIA – 217

VBIEDs by Beladiyah

23 NOV – 6 DEC VBIED FOUND – 5, VBIED DET – 15, SVBIED DET – 3
 7 – 20 DEC VBIED FOUND – 3, VBIED DET – 9, SVBIED DET – 5
 21 DEC – 3 JAN VBIED FOUND – 6, VBIED DET – 13, SVBIED DET – 0

